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China’s WTO Accession andItsImpact on China，s Financial  
System  
地上伽   
ChinaJOlnedtheWTOonDecemberllth，2001・Itwas15yearsafteritsapplication  
totheGATTin1986・TheaccessiontotheWTOisaboldstepforwardforChinato  
reformits economy．The accessionwi11a鮎ct not only the realsector，but also the  
丘nancialsector・China，s丘nancialindustrywillfaceenormouscha11engesandsuccessfu1  
reform would have a profound e鮎ct on thefuture of China，s economy．It would  
COntributetoamoresustainablegrowthofthecountryandwouldhaveaverypositive  









May2000theEUandChina丘nallycametoanagreement．   
Immediately after theformalsignlng CeremOny Of Novemberll，2001，China  
noti丘edtheWTOthatithadratifiedthemembershipterms，PaVingthewayforthe  
WOrld－smostpopulousnationanditsfourthbiggesttrader（countingthe EUasone  
trader）tobecometheWTOTs143rdmemberonDecemberll．  
China’s WTO commitment represents the consolidation of the 37 bilateral  
agreements withthe United States，the European Union and otherWTO members．  
China’smarketaccesscommitmentsincludetheeliminationorreductionoftariffrates  
andtherelaxationofvariousnon－tariffrestrictions，includingtheremovalofbarriersto  
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importsofagriculturalproducts，andreductioninquotasontradeinservices．1  
（a）恥riffratereductionandreductionofnon－tariffbarriers  
When Chinaimplementsthese commitments，China’s average tarifErate willgo  
downfrom18．9％to15％foragrlCulturalproductsandfrom14．8％to8．9％forindustrial  
goods．Amongindustrialgoods the tariffrate onIT products willbecome zerofrom  
13．3％and on automobilesfrom80－100％to25％．Tablelshows the tariffreductions   
afterChina，saccessiontotheWTO．  
Tablel TariffReductionafterChina，sAccessiontotheWTO  
Sectororselect：edsub－SeCtOr   Leve［in2001  TarifFIeve［afterWTO  Differencebetween2001  
（％）   accession（％）   appliedandagreedrates  
（％）   
AQricu［ture：aVeraqe  18．9   15rl．1．20051   3．9   
Industria［DrOducts：aVeraC［e  14．8   8．9rl．1．20051   5．9  
ITproducts   13．3   0（1．1．2005）   13．3  
Automobi［es   80－100   25rl．7．20061   55－75  
Text‖esandaDDare［  25．4   11．7rl．1．20051   13．7  
SteeI   10．6   8，1rl．1．20041   2．5   
Source：OECD［2002］  
China’s commitment to concessionsin the tradein goodsis evaluated as  
COmParabletothoseofthemaJOrASEANcountries．2Forexample，the丘naltariff1evel  
Ofindustrialproducts，8．9percent，is higherthanthe current rates ofO per centof  
Singaporeor6．9percentofthePhilippine，butlowerthanthoseofIndonesia（8．8per  
cent），Malaysia（10percent）orThailand（15．8percent）．   
払）Concessionsrelatingto丘nancialservices  
China’scommitmentsarenotlimitedtothegoodstrade．Chinahasmadeabroad  




China needs to developits service sectorin order to offbr more employment  
OPPOrtunitiesforitspopulation．  
China’s commitments cover 丘nancial services， distribution，business，  
10ECD［2002］p．749  
2Japanteam［2002］p．234  
86   






bankswi11befreeto o鮎rthe renminbiservices allover Chinain丘veyears．Intwo  








uponChina’saccessiontotheWTO．   
IfChinaobservedthiscommitment，in丘veyearsforeignbankswouldtheoretically  




becauseforelgn banks could otherwisefund theirloans by utilizing money market  
funding．If such restrictions should beimposedfurther，fair competition between  
Chineseandforelgnbankswouldbedifficulttoachieve．  
ThecapitalmarketwillbeopenedtoforelgnCOmPetitioninaveryrestrictedway．  




Chinese companies，With a maximum equity stake ofone thirdto engage（without  
Chineseintermediary）intheunderwritingofalltypesofsharesaswellasgovernment  
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obliged to overhaulgovernment policies，regulations and administrative systems・  
JoiningtheWTOrequiresanewmembertorunitseconomicpolicyaccordingtothe  
“ruleoflaw”insteadofthelongtraditionof the“ruleofmen”andChinawillhaveto  
changeits government policies，regulations and administrative systems on this  
principle．ItwillmakeChinamoretransparentandaccessibletoforeigncompanies・3  
For this purpose，China started to〃clean up〃its existinglegalsystem・The  
ministrieshavereviewedmanylawsandregulationsanddecidedtorepealoramend  




lowering oftariffg and the abolition ofquotas willbring more competition to the  
domesticmarket．TheincreasedpresenceofforelgnCOmPaniesintheservicesectorswill  







willhave moved toward a regime based on tari鮎．It willbe phasing out quotas，  
1icenses and other non－trade barriers．Industries will払ce a di鮎rentlevelof  
competition，dependingontheircomparativeadvantagesandonthespeedofdomestic  
demandgrowth．   
In general，the textile sector willbene凸t the most，because alaborintensive  
industrylike apparelhas a comparative advantagein China．In contrast，  
capital－intensiveindustrieslike automobiles，PetrOleum，electronics，maChinery and  
ferrousmetalscouldlose，aSPrOteCtionforthesesectorswillgraduallybephasedout．  
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governmenttostreamlinetheindustryduetotheresistanceoftherelevantreglOnS．   










entry．According to Hagiwara，Who studied the Chineseindustries one year after  
accession，5theyseemtobeperformlngbetterthananticipatedbeforetheentry．One  
exampleis the electronicsindustry．Another exampleis the automobileindustry．In  
SPite ofthe reducedimporttaxrate，the electronicsindustrylS COmPetingwellwith  






POSSibilitythat Chinamightbecometheexportbaseforforeigncarcompaniesinthe  
且1ture．  
However，Chineseindustrieswillface arealchallengelateronwhentariffrates  
Willbefurtherloweredandtheeconomymoreopentotheworldthantoday．Thiswill  
PrOmOte areformprocesswithinChina．Thereishighpossibilitythatuncompetitive  
COmPanieswillbeforcedoutfromthemarketsandthe丘nancialindustrieswillfeelthe  
Pain．   
O））E脆ctonChina，sfinancialindustry   
Inadditiontothee鮎ctcomingfromtherealsector，China’sfinancialsystemalso  
faces directchallengeswithinthe sector，becauseitwillfacetoughcompetitionfrom  
forelgninstitutions．  
AccordingtoChina’sagreementwiththeWTO，itisobligedtoopenupitsfinancial  
markets toforeign丘rms within且ve yearsfrom accession．This willcreate stiff  
5Hagiwara［2002】  
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competitionfor China’s 丘nancialindustry．Usuallyforelgn丘rms have a strong  
competitive edgeinthe丘elds ofinvestment banking，1ike securitization，M＆Aand  
pr房ect丘nance．Theinvestmentbankingbusinesswillnotbeopeneddirectlytoforeign  
banks but they are permitted to form joint ventures with Chinese entities and 
Participateinthecapitalmarketactivities．   
Mostoftheforeignbankswillhesitatetoparticipateintheretailmarketandto  
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transactions．ThePCBCtransferredbudgetfundsanddistributedthemtotheSOEsfor  
丘Ⅹedassetinvestment．Thesethreebanksconstitutedamono－banksystem andthey  
WOrked morelike administrative agents than realbanks．The function of this  
mono－banksystemwastota11ydiffbrentfromtheusualbankingsystem ofdeveloped  
COuntries．Themono・bankworkedasakindofbudgetdistributionsystem．   













banks，thecitycooperativesbanks，andthecreditcooperatives．   
ThefourSOCBsaretheAgriculturalBankofChina（ABC），theBankofChina  
（BOC），theIndustrialand CommercialBank of China（ICBC）and the China  
ConstructionBank（CCB）．  




fundsfor smallscale且nancing ofsuch private companies，ruralcredit cooperatives  
（RCCs）under the supervision ofABC and urban credit cooperatives（UCCs）were  
Createdin1986underthesupervisionofICBC．  
Chartlshows deposit shares ofthese bankinginstitutions．The major part of  
bankingactivityisstilldominatedbyfourSOCBs．  
Thegovernmentalsoestablishedthreepolicybanksin1994．Theyarethe State  
DevelopmentBankofChina，theExportandImportBankofChinaandtheAgricultural  
DevelopmentBankofChina．Thesepolicybankshavecontributedtofreeingcommercial  
banksfrom politicaldecision－making and enabledthem to make decisions based on  
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Source：乃e月ヲCpゐを励刀丘（ぱ（詭血∂¢ぴβr坤蝕姑玩沼ノ風上肋血  
economicgrounds．   
From1995，UrbanCooperativeBanksstartedtobeestablishedbasedontheUCCs，  







isaverymarginalmarketinChina．Mostfundsnowthroughthebankingsystem・   
Vbrylarge part ofthisflow throughthe banking system goes throughthefour  
state－OWnedcommercialbanks．  
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Table2 FlowofFunds2000  
（Unit：100m潮onRMB）  
Nont吊nancial  General  Financiat  Therestofthe  
Household                 COrPOrations   Government   Institutions  world  
Source  Source  Source  SourGe  Source  
Uses   S  Uses   S  Uses   S  Uses   S  Uses   S   
Net Financial Investment 7898  －5269  －1000  67  －1696  
Deposits   6610  7767  2054  538  16425  －4  538   
Loans  2972  9317  263  13969  －307  －198  1526   
Securities   2223  2200   19  3132  3335  818  572  
Bonds   696  100  3132  3335  818  
Governmentandpub［icbonds   770 3132  2343  
Share   1527  2100  






for China’s丘nancialsystem are many－Sided．However，Iwillconcentrate on the  
problemsofnon－Performingloans（NPLs），COrPOrategOVernanCeOfbanks，interestrate  
liberalization，SME access to banklending and the role offoreign banks．These  
PrOblems are closely related to other topicslike bank supervision，regulation，  
accountingand strengtheningofcapitalmarkets．However，Iwouldliketolimitthe  
discussion here tothefour points．Thesefour points are essentialforimmediate  
bankingreforminChina．  
（a）Non・Performingloans  
NPLs are stilla serious problemfor China．As the history ofChina’s且nancial  
SyStemShows，therewasnoclearseparationbetweentheroleofdiffbrentbanksand  
there 
POlicybanks．These banking organizations and the centralplannlng SyStem CauSed  
NPLstoaccumulate．  
TheChineseauthoritystartedtotacklethesedeeprootedprobleminthe90s．In  
1999thefourcommercialbanks eachsetup anAMC towhichtheytransferredbad  
loans．Thefour AMCs are Cinda，GreatⅥhll，Orient and Huarong．Each AMC  
PurChasesbadloansfromeachbankatfacevalueandfundsthepurchasethroughthe  
issueofbondsimplicitlybackedbytheMinistryofFinance．  
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Table3 AssetManagementCompaniesofFourSOCBs  
CCB   ABC   BOC   ICBC   Tota】  
TotalAsset（asofend2001，RMBhundredmi＝on）  27，650   25，280   25，966   43，181  122，077  
RatioofNPL（asofend2001，％）  19，35   n．a．   27．51   29．8  25，37   
AssetManagementCompany  Cinda   GreatWall   Orient   Huarong  
Dateofestablishment  1999／4／20  1999／10／18  1999／10／15  1999／10／19  
Sourceoffunds（RMBhunderedm＝ion）  
Capita［（fromMinistryofFinance）  100   100   100   100   400  
LendingbyPBOC  0   3，458   1，074   947  5，479  
Issueofdebenturesunderwrittenbygroupbanks）  3，730   0   1，600   3，130  8二460   
TrasferamounttoAMC（RMBhundredm‖ion）  3，730   3，458   2，674   4，077  13，939  
NPLdispositionamount（unti12002／9）（A）  702   838   340   443  2，323  
Recoveryamount（B）  280   160   192   214   846  
RecoverYratio（B／A，％）  39．9   19．1   56．5   48．3   36．4  
Cashrecovery（C）   216   77   86   146   525  
Cashrecoveryratio（C／A、％）   30．8   9．2   25．3   33．0   22．6  
Debtequityswap  
Number of corporations 168   21   65   333   587  


















PreSident of BOC，eXPreSSed his hope to grow・Out Of problemloans and the vice  










Amount（bnRMBun］essotherwiseindicated）   Total   Al】banks  SOCB   JSandCity  Co－OPeratives   
Assets   13745   11672   10144   2110   2073   
Loanstonon一月nancia［institutionsl   10 0388 8452   7606   1171  
EstimatedNPL   4164   3371   3202   234  793   
Percentofa”loans（％）2   41   40   42   20   50   
NPLtobeassumedbygovernment   3160   2526   2441   1 4  634   
CapitaIinjections   65   33  33   32   
Tota［grosscost／GDP（％）   36   29   27   3   7   





Table5 RangeofPossibleCostsofFinancialSystemCleanUp  
（PercentofGDP）  
Netcostunderbase［ine（seepriortable）  30 
Withh  igherNPLl  44   
Higher   NPLpluslowerrecoveryrate2   51 
t  Onalcostofsupportforpolicybanks   〝＋5  
t  OnalcostofloweringNPLratioto7．5％   ～＋2   
Rangeofpossib［ecost  30 to 58 
1．NPLforSOCBs of40percentand co－OPerativesof66percent．  
2．Recovery rate of5percentversus15percentin baseline．  
Source：OECD  
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Figure 2 Profit and Loss Situation of SOE 
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grow－Out Strategy tO WOrkis thatthe system which accumulated the NPLs willno  
longerbethesame．TbpreventNPLsincreasingfurther，SOEs，themaJOrborrowersof  
SOCBs，muStimprovetheirpro丘tability．  
Althoughthere are many cases ofreportedimprovementsinthe pro丘tability of  
SOEs，furthereffortshavetobemade．Thenextchartshowsthatthepro丘tsofSOEsin  
totalareincreasingafter‘98．   
Inthe past，the so－Called“softbudgeting”and“policyloans”have caused many  
PrOblems．11Asmentionedearlier，Chinaestablishedthreepolicybanksandseparated  
thefunctions ofcommercialbanks and policy banks．SOCBs have been ordered to  
decreaseNPLsandtheirbrancheshavebeenorderedbytheirheadquarterstoreduce  
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SuggeStS that considerations beyond strict commercialcriteria stillplay a rolein a  
Significantamountoflending12．   
O））StrengthemingcorporategovernanCeOfbanks   
In ordertoimprove such a situation，itis essentialto strengthenthe corporate  
governancestructureoftheChinesebanks，eSPeCiallySOCBs．Mr．LiuofBankofChina  
mentioned，in the same ADBImeeting，the necessity to strengthen the corporate  
governance ofthe SOCBs．13In order to achieve this he stressed theimportance of  
SOCBs recapitalizing through equity and bondissuancein the capitalmarket．  




％rkin three to且ve years14．Other two SOCBs，BOC andICBC are said to have  
intentionstolisttheirstocksdomesticallyandoverseas．Suchlistingwillcontributeto  
Strengtheningcorporategovernanceandthesee放）rtSShouldbepromotedfurther．  
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TherehavebeengoodreasonsforChinatokeepinterestrateregulationinthepast．  














notbeenfu脆11ed，because the SOEs tend notto manage theirinvestmentbasedon  
interestratelevels．Thesituationisnotsodiffbrenteventoday．Theverdictonthethird  
COndition，Ofsoundbanks，isself・eVident．ThebanksstillholdlargeNPLseventoday．  
Thefourthconditionis nowbeingfu1fi11edbecausethecentralbankhaschangedits  
POlicyinstruments toindirect controlfrom direct control．PBOC has changed their  
monetarypolicytoindirectcontrol．Thenfthconditionofprudentbanksupervisionhas  
beenimproved and willbeimprovedfurther．Most of Wei’s results seem to be  
applicablein China today，anditsinterest rateliberalization process should be  
PrOmOtedverycarefu11y．  
Chinastartedtoliberalizeinterestratesveryrecently．In1999thePBOCissuedits  
POlicy toliberalizeinterestsin China and de丘ned the prlOrities．According to this  
SChedule，the RMBinterest rates willbeliberalized within three years．Forelgn  
CurrenCydepositsandloanrateswillbeliberalized．ThentheRMBinterestrateswill  





































share ofcollective且rms，Self－emPloyed and othersincludingprivate丘rmsincreased  
dramatically．20  
20W加増［2002】p．30．  
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Figure3IndustrialProductionandShareofDi鮎rentCoporationTypes  
78798081828384858687888990g19293949596979899990001   
Note：A氏er2000，thestatisticschangedtocoversSOEandnon－StateenterPrlSeSWhosesalesareover  
RMB5million  
Source：（二地血a励atLgtibal‡をali）00k   
In spite of thisincreasing role of SMEs，an eXtenSive survey conducted by  
InternationalFinanceCorporationin1999foundthatprlVateenterPrlSeSreliedalmost  
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（Ybar2001）   Figure4 SourceofFunding  













SOE Cooperatives Private  Forelgn   
Source；〔迅カコβ蝕由血ノ】ちβカ0正  
Theliberalizationofinterestrateswillenablebankstoprovidefundsatrealistic  
rates，Which may be higher than banklending rates now．But smallpro丘table  
COrPOrationscanborrowandinvestsuchfundsinamoremeaningfu1waythanSOEs．   




effortswillimproveSMEs’accesstobanklending．   
In order to make China’s economy competitive enoughfor the WTO opening，  
improvlngtheaccessofSMEstomoreflexiblebanklendinglSVerylmPOrtant．  
（e）Theroleofforeignbanks   
In the development process ofChina’s丘nancialsystem，foreignbanks willplay  
importantrolesandtheiractivityshouldnotbecurbedordisturbedasfaraspossible．  
Vらry recently some Chinese banks have acceptedforelgn bank participation．Such  
Participationwillbene丘tChina’sfinancialsystem，becauseforelgnbankswillbringln  
newtechnologyandservicestotheChinesemarket．（Table6）  
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Table6 ForelgnBanksParticipation  
Chinesebanks   TbtalAsset  Shareofforelgnbanks  
（2001，RMB  incapital   
bi11ion）   
ShanhaiBank   n．a．   HSBC   8％   
ⅩianCityCommercialBank  n．a．   ScotiaBank（Canada）  2％   
ShenzenDevelopmentBank  67．23   NewBridgeCapital  
（US）   
Pudong Development Bank 130．7  Citibank   10％   
China Minsheng Bank 68．6   Hang Seng Bank Undernegotiation   
Source：A血∂刀aCdrα血aを飽β刀Cea刀d励月必打g  
thebankingindustryfromcompetition．However，itis notthe right stepforward．It  
WOuldbemoreproductiveforChinatodevelopthemoneymarketwithinthecountry  
and toletforeignbankslend money to companies who need suchfundingfor new  
investments．Itwould make the Chineseindustry more competitive．Therefore such  
restrictionsshouldberemovedassoonascircumstanceallows．  
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However；theexperienceofothercountriesshowthatevenahighgrowtheconomyfhces  
di伍culttimesandsucheconomy払11sintorecessionsometimes．  










by establishing an e瓜cient and sound丘nancialsystem．For this purpose bank  






PBOCwouldconcentrateonthemacro－eCOnOmicpolicy．   
Inordertoavoidasystemicriskitisimportanttogainthecon丘denceofdomestic  
andinternationalinvestors．Asdiscussedintheearliersection，Strengtheningcorporate  
governance andimprovlngdisclosure arethe necessarysteps．Banks shoulddisclose  








Interestliberalization was completedin1993．However，Japan had kept other  
regulationstoolongandprotectedJapanesebanksfromrealmarketcompetition．The  
failurewasmainlyfromthelatterhalfof1980sandintothe1990s．Iwouldliketoname  
23 帽芳“China’sgrowlngdebtsstirsdebate，fuelsfears”，January20，2003  





















80s morethantheydidandshouldhaveletbanks controltheirrisksbythemselves  
independentlyandletthemcompeteinatruesense．  









two reasons．  
Thefirstisthatanopenmarketeconomyneedstheflexibilitytoadjustexchange  
rates．Entry to the WTO means that China willliberalizeits trade and when an  
imbalance occursin trade，t！1enthe exchange rate becomes one of theimportant  
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abrupt adjustment process．The Asian丘nancialcrisis showed how severely such  
adjustment Can hurt the countries concerned．The丘Ⅹed rate peg may cause an  
imbalancein the balance ofpayments．AlthoughChina haslargeforelgn eXChange  
reservesatthemoment，thesituationcouldchangeratherquickly．   
In order to avoid such an abrupt currency risk，China should move to a more  
flexibleexchangeratesystem．Atthesametime，banksshoulddeveloptheirinternal  
riskcontroIsystemaspartofstrengtheningthe且nancialsystem．Onewaytomovetoa  
moreflexible exchange rate system would be to adopt a currency basket system．25  
Improving且nancialcooperationwithotherAsiancountrieswouldalsobeimportant．  
4．Conclusions  
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COntrOllablebuttheyareinevitable．   
Mr．Keating，theformer prime minister ofAustralia，referredin his speechin  
Be毎inglastyearto丘nancialreforminChina27．HerecognizedtheproblemsofChina’s  
丘nancialsystem，butatthesametimehementionedthattheChineseleadersandthe  
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Annex China’scommitmentsto且nancialindustryreforminthebankingsector：   
（お耶〆血のye叩  
Bankingandother且nancialservices  
Forelgn CurrenCy  
business   
Local currency  
business   Uponaccession   Shanghai，Shenzhen，Tiaqln  
andDalian  
Within one year after  Guangzhou，Zhuhai，Qingdao，  
aCCeSSlOn   NangiingandWuhan  
Within two years after  Jinan，Fuzhou，Chengdu and  
aCCeSSlOn   Chongqlng  
Withinthreeyearsafter  
aCCeSSlOn，   
Within four years after  Shantou，Ningbo，Shenyangand  
aCCeSSlOn，   Ⅹian  
Within 丘ve years after  allgeographicrestrictionswill  
aCCeSSlOn   beremoved   
肋由  
For  forelgn  CurrenCy  uponaccession   foreign丘nancialinstitutionswere   
business  Permittedtoprovideservicesin  
China without restriction 
Forlocalcurrencybusines  Within two years  foreign且nancialinstitutionswill  
afteraccession   bepermittedtoprovideservicesto  
Chineseenterprises  
Within 丘ve years  Foreign丘nancialinstitutionswill  







suchbusiness．   
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